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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
section 78-2-2(3) and UTAH R. APP. P. 3. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the employment contract between 
the parties did not entitle Dr. Macdonald to a retention review where the contract states, 
without disclaimer, that employees must have a retention review "on an annual basis" and 
further states that the University will work with Dr. Macdonald "toward meeting the criteria 
for reappointment and retention reviews." 
The interpretation of a contract presents a question of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness with no deference to the trial court. Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 
50, [^16, 84 P.3d 1134 (citations omitted). This issue was preserved below. (R. at 169-74 
and 307-12.) 
2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the parties' employment contract 
was unambiguous where the trial court focused only on portions of the contract favorable to 
the University' s interpretation and ignored those favorable to Dr. Macdonald's interpretation. 
Whether the terms of a contract are ambiguous is a question of law, which is reviewed 
for correctness with no deference to the trial court. Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 356,358 
(Utah 1990). This issue was preserved below. (R. at 174-76 and 312-16.) 
iv 
3. Whether the trial court erred in finding that there were no genuine issues as to 
any material fact regarding Dr. Macdonaid's claim for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing where the University disputes Dr. Macdonaid's allegation that the 
Radiology Department Chairman made false and disparaging representations about Dr. 
Macdonald to individuals deciding whether or not to renew her contract, thus tainting the 
very people who should have been conducting an impartial retention review. 
Whether a trial court correctly concluded that no genuine issues as to any material fact 
existed in granting summary judgment is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness 
with no deference to the trial court. Johnson v. Hermes Assoc., Ltd, 2005 UT 82, ^ fl 1, 128 
P.3d 1151. This issue was preserved below. (R. at 176-77.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The interpretation of the following rule is of central importance to the third issue 
raised in this appeal: 
Summary Judgment, Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
v 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). There are not other constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is determinative of or of central 
importance to the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, 
This appeal concerns the interpretation of an employment contract between the 
University of Utah (the "University") and one of its instructors and practicing physicians, 
Nancy Macdonald, M.D. ("Dr. Macdonald"). The employment contract consisted of two 
principal documents: (1) a letter agreement appointing Dr. Macdonald to her position at the 
University and (2) the University's personnel policies, including, specifically, the University 
of Utah School of Medicine's Retention, Promotion and Tenure (RPT) Policies and 
Procedures ("Retention Policy"). 
The Retention Policy set forth, without disclaimer, the procedure the University must 
follow when deciding whether or not to retain an employee and stated that employees would 
be reviewed "on an annual basis." The letter agreement stated that the University would 
work with Dr. Macdonald "toward meeting the criteria for reappointment and retention 
reviews." After working for the University for almost two years, the University decided not 
to retain Dr. Macdonald as an employee by not renewing her annual contract. Before 
terminating Dr. Macdonald in this fashion, the University did nothing to work with Dr. 
Macdonald "toward meeting the criteria for reappointment and retention reviews" as 
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promised, and in fact did not afford her even the contractual safeguard of conducting a 
retention review, despite its policies stating that such a review should take place on an annual 
basis. 
II. Course of the Proceedings. 
Alleging that the University's failure to conduct a retention review before deciding 
not to retain her was a breach of her employment contract, Dr. Macdonald filed a complaint 
against the University for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing and violation of due process. (R. at 1-14.) 
Shortly after the case commenced, the University moved for summary judgment on 
all causes of action arguing that the parties' contract was unambiguous and that it did not 
afford a retention review to Dr. Macdonald prior to her termination because she was an 
untenured "auxiliary" faculty member employed only on an annual contract. (R. at 111-26.) 
Dr. Macdonald filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on her breach of 
contract claim, arguing that the parties' contract unambiguously guaranteed her the safeguard 
of a retention review before any decision not to retain her could be made. (R. at 162-74.) 
In the alternative, Dr. Macdonald argued that if, when read together, the provisions of the 
contract guaranteeing retention reviews were inconsistent with other provisions of the 
contract, any ambiguity created thereby should be construed in her, the non-drafting party's, 
favor. (R. at 174-76.) 
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Dr. Macdonald did not move for summary judgement on her claim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because of the existence of genuine issues 
of material fact regarding that claim, which she maintains preclude summary judgement on 
that cause of action.1 (R. at 176-77.) 
III. Disposition of the Trial Court. 
On January 19,2006, the trial court heard oral argument on the parties' cross- motions 
for summary judgment. (R. at 332.) On March 28, 2006, the trial court entered its Order 
granting the University's motion for summary judgment and denying Dr. Macdonald's cross-
motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed the action. (R. at 332-36.) Dr. 
Macdonald filed a notice of appeal on April 26, 2006. (R. at 337-39.) No motions were 
filed pursuant to Rules 50(b), 52(b) or 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
IV. Statement of Facts. 
The cross-motions for summary judgment were decided on the following undisputed 
facts (R. at 114-17, 163-66 and 280-82.): 
1. On or about September 19, 2001, the University sent Dr. Macdonald a letter 
agreement offering Dr. Macdonald a position as a clinical track faculty member in the 
University's radiology department. (R. at 280-82.) 
1
 Dr. Macdonald's claim regarding deprivation of due process is not at issue in this 
appeal. 
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2. The letter agreement stated, in part: "Clinical Track appointments must be 
renewed annually. In addition, the School of Medicine will conduct a retention review 
during your 3rd and 6th years, and every five years thereafter. [We] will work with you toward 
meeting the criteria for reappointment and retention reviews." (R. at 115 and 164.) 
3. The criteria for reappointment and retention reviews referred to in the letter 
agreement are set forth in the Retention Policy. (R. at 164.) 
4. One of the Retention Policy's purposes is to "assure that the School of 
Medicine appropriately recognizes the contributions made by individual members of the 
faculty." (R. at 164.) 
5. To that end, the Retention Policy sets forth specific retention review 
"requirements" that the School of Medicine must follow with regard to clinical-track faculty. 
These include a requirement that the School of Medicine review a clinical-track faculty 
member's employment "on an annual basis." (R. at 164.) 
6. The Retention Policy also sets forth specific procedures that the Department, 
the Departmental Advisory Committee and others must follow in conducting reappointment 
and retention reviews. (R. at 165.) 
7. Dr. Macdonald accepted the University's employment offer on or about 
September 19, 2001 and began working in January of 2002. (R. at 115 and 163.) 
8. The letter agreement and the University's Retention Policy created a binding 
employment contract between the parties. (R. at 114-15, 281 and 284.) 
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9. The University renewed Dr. Macdonald's contract following her first contract 
term. (R. at 115.) 
10. Toward the end of her second contract term, the University sent Dr. Macdonald 
a letter that read in part: 
In reviewing the educational and clinical needs of the Department of radiology 
for the upcoming year, the Department has determined that it will not 
recommend the renewal of your Clinical Track appointment. All Clinical 
Track appointments are one year in length, and are renewed each year 
thereafter for successive terms of one (1) year unless either the faculty member 
or the University gives written notice to the other of its intent not to renew the 
appointment. 
(R. at 115-16.) 
11. The University's notice came as a complete shock to Dr. Macdonald, as it was 
always her understanding, based upon her employment contract, that she would undergo a 
retention review before any decision not to retain her was made. (R. at 158, ^ } 4-5, 165.) 
12. The University, in fact, failed to follow almost all the procedures outlined in 
the Retention Policy before deciding not to retain Dr. Macdonald. (R. at 165, 281-82.) 
13. The University does not claim that it followed all the procedures required by 
the Retention Policy. Rather, the University's position is that it did not need to comply with 
its own Retention Policy, because it does not apply to clinical track faculty, such as Dr. 
Macdonald. (R. at 166 and 282.) 
14. Thereafter, the University terminated Dr. Macdonald's employment. (R. at 
165.) 
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15. Subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit, the University amended its Retention 
Policy to change the retention review procedures for clinical track faculty such as Dr. 
Macdonald. (R. at 174 and 198-204.) 
The University's motion for summary judgment regarding Dr. Macdonald's claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was decided despite the 
following disputed fact (R. at 166-67.): 
1. During an abbreviated meeting of faculty members, the Radiology Department 
Chairman, Dr. Steve Stevens, made false and disparaging representations about Dr. 
Macdonald to individuals deciding whether or not to renew her contract, thus tainting the 
very people who should have been conducting a retention review. Dr. Boyd Vomocil, a 
coworker of Dr. Macdonald's who was at the meeting, informed her shortly after the meeting 
that Dr. Stevens responded "yes" to a question about whether Dr. Macdonald had been 
warned of deficiencies in her performance, which is not true. (R. at 166-67, 300-01.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court erred in finding that the employment contract between the 
parties did not entitle Dr. Macdonald to a retention review. Two principal documents 
comprise the parties contract: the University's Retention Policy and a Letter Agreement 
memorializing Dr. Macdonald's acceptance of the University's offer of employment. Both 
documents refer to reappointment and retention reviews. The Retention Policy states that 
such views must be conducted annually. The Letter Agreement states that the University will 
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work with Dr. Macdonald toward meeting the criteria for the reviews. Despite the promises 
and the procedural safeguards outlined in the Retention Policy, the University made the 
decision not to retain Dr. Macdonald before giving her the retention review she was 
promised. The University concedes the Retention Policy formed part of Dr. Macdonald's 
contract but maintains she was not entitled to the Policy's actual protections. The University 
is wrong. By failing to provide her the fundamental protections outlined in its own Retention 
Policy, the University breach Dr. Macdonald's employment contract and the trial court's 
decision granting the University's motion for summary judgment on this issue must be 
reversed. 
2. The trial court erred in finding that the parties' employment contract 
unambiguously denied Dr. Macdonald the procedural safeguards outlined in the Retention 
Policy. The trial court focused on language in the policy concerning retention reviews 
occurring at years three, five and six to the exclusion of language in the policy mandating 
annual retention reviews. It is a fundamental rule of contract construction that trial courts 
must attempt to harmonize and give meaning to all the provisions of a contract, not just those 
supporting a particular interpretation. Moreover, if two conflicting contract provisions may 
not be reasonably harmonized, an ambiguity arises in the contract that must be construed 
against the drafter, in this case the University. Thus, to the extent that there exists an 
unavoidable tension between the provision of the contract calling for retention reviews only 
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at specifically enumerated years and the provision of the contract mandating annual reviews, 
that tension must be resolved in favor of Dr. Macdonald. 
3. The trial court erred in finding that there were no genuine issues as to any 
material fact regarding Dr. Macdonald's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. The Chairman of Dr. Macdonald's medical department made false and 
disparaging statements about Dr. Macdonald to the doctors who were being asked to vote 
whether or not to retain her as a clinical-track instructor at the University. The University 
denies this occurred. This fact goes to the heart of Dr. Macdonald's claim for breach of the 
implied covenant of fair dealing, which stands independently from her claim for breach of 
contract. Because of this disputed issue of material fact, it was improper for the trial court 
to grant summary judgment on this claim. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN RULING 
THAT DR. MACDONALD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE 
PROTECTIONS OF HER EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT. 
Dr. Macdonald was entitled to the benefits of her contract. It is well established that 
"an educational institution may undertake a contractual obligation to observe particular 
termination formalities by adopting procedures or by promulgating rules and regulations 
governing the employment relationship." Piacitelliv. Southern Utah State College, 636 P'.2d 
1063, 1066 (Utah 1981) (citations omitted); see also Cherry v. Utah State Univ., 966 P.2d 
866, 869 (1998). In Piacitelli, a case with facts strikingly similar to those here, a college 
sought to justify its failure to follow its own retention policy by attempting to distinguish its 
decision not to "reappoint" Piacitelli from a "termination." Piacitelli, 636 P.2d at 1064. 
Piacitelli, like Dr. Macdonald, was employed on a year-to-year basis and was ineligible for 
tenure. The college argued that Piacitelli was not entitled to formal retention procedures 
because "he was not dismissed at all, but simply not rehired." Id. The trial court rejected the 
school's argument, ruling that failing to renew a contract constituted termination of 
employment. Id. at 1065.2 
The Piacitelli court's ruling is sound, as it squares both with logic and the plain 
meaning of words. It is a matter of common sense that if one's employment contract is not 
renewed, he or she is not retained as an employee, and his or her employment is thus 
2
 The college did not contest this ruling on appeal. Id. 
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terminated. Courts across the country, therefore, treat these terms indistinguishably. See, 
e.g Williams v. Florida Mem 7 Coll, 453 So. 2d 541, 542 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (using 
the terms "terminate" and "not renewing . . . contract" interchangeably); Beckwith v. Rhode 
Island Sck of Design, 404 A.2d 480,483 (R.I. 1979) (positing termination as the alternative 
to not renewing employment contract); McHugh v. Board ofEduc, 100 F. Supp. 2d 231, 
247-48 (D. Del. 2000) ("Defendants cannot avoid the [statutory prohibitions] by 
characterizing their action as a decision not to renew an employment contract, as opposed to 
a decision to terminate an employment contract."). 
As both colleges in Piacitelli and Cherry did, the University of Utah adopted a 
Retention Policy. This is undisputed. It is further undisputed that this Retention Policy, 
which required annual retention reviews, formed part of the employment agreement between 
the University and Dr. Macdonald. The University therefore undertook a contractual 
obligation to observe certain procedures before deciding not to retain Dr. Macdonald. 
Nevertheless, despite admitting that it adopted a Retention Policy and that this policy formed 
part of Dr. Macdonald's employment contract, the University denied Dr. Macdonald the 
fundamental safeguard of a retention review as outlined in the Retention Policy. The 
University has attempted to justify this failure by arguing, similar to the college in Piacitelli, 
that Dr. Macdonald was not entitled to a retention review because she was not terminated at 
all, but that her contract simply expired. As the Piacitelli and Cherry courts point out, 
however, choosing not to renew an employee's one-year contract is just another form of 
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termination, and the employee should be entitled to the protections of the retention policy 
adopted by the college. The University therefore breached its employment agreement with 
Dr. Macdonald by failing to provide her with the mandated review before choosing not to 
renew her contract. 
A. It Is Undisputed That the School of Medicine Adopted a 
Faculty Retention Policy. 
The University's policies require each department, including the School of Medicine, 
to "formulate and distribute to all faculty members in the department a statement of criteria 
to be used in retention, promotion, and tenure reviews." See University Policies and 
Procedures, Faculty Regulations ("University Policy"), Ch. V, § 2, as cited in the 
University's Reply Memorandum to its Motion for Summary Judgment at 6. (R. at 283.) 
The School of Medicine's formulation of "criteria to be used in retention" and the specific 
procedures to be followed to determine if those criteria are met is embodied in its Retention 
Policy, which it adopted pursuant to and consistent with the University Policy. 
Having adopted these procedures, the School of Medicine, sometimes referred to 
herein as "the University," was contractually obligated to follow them prior to making any 
decision regarding Dr. Macdonald's retention. This is true whether the University terminated 
Dr. Macdonald's employment prior to the expiration of her renewable contract or whether 
it chose, as it did, not to renew her contract, as both actions result in termination. See 
Piacitelli at 1064-65 (rejecting argument that termination procedures would have applied 
only had Piacitelli been dismissed prior to expiration of his contract); Cherry, 966 P.2d 866 
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(reaffirming contractual obligation of school to follow termination procedures set forth in 
school policy for employee whose one-year contract was not renewed). 
B. It Is Undisputed That the Retention Policy Formed Part of 
the Employment Contract Between the University and Dr. 
Macdonald. 
As the University conceded below, "it is undisputed that the Retention Policy is part 
of the agreement between the [parties]." (R. at 284.) The University used the word 
"policies" instead of "parties." Given the context of the sentence, however, it is safe to 
presume that this was simply an oversight. Therefore, the Retention Policy along with the 
Letter agreement formed the parties' employment contract. (R. at 114-15, 281 and 284.) 
C. By Adopting a Retention Policy, the University Was 
Contractually Obligated to Follow it Before Deciding Not to 
Renew Dr. MacdonakTs Employment Contract. 
The Retention Policy guaranteed that Dr. Macdonald's employment would be 
reviewed on an "annual" basis, or at least prior to any decision being made not to retain her 
as an employee. The first 20 pages of the Retention Policy reference all faculty members 
generally. See Retention Policy, Table of Contents. (R. at 186.) These pages outline the 
retention review procedures and other policies applicable to all faculty generally. 
See Retention Policy at 9-14. (R. at 187-92.) The remainder of the Retention Policy 
addresses policies and issues specific to the various faculty subsets, including full-time 
clinical track faculty, of which Dr. Macdonald was one. 
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The clinical-track faculty provisions set forth a number of supplemental "retention 
requirements" which add to those set forth in the generally applicable Policy & Procedures 
section. The "retention requirements" that apply to Dr. Macdonald and other clinical-track 
faculty reference specific-year reviews and "annual" reviews, the procedures and 
requirements for both of which are set forth in the previous, general section applicable to all 
faculty. See Retention Policy, at 40 and 41, ffi| 6 and 8. (R. at 40-41.) Significantly, the 
section of the Retention Policy specifically applicable to auxiliary faculty plainly states: "The 
following retention and promotion requirements apply: . . . Employment is reviewed by the 
department on an annual basis . . . ." Id. 
This annual review requirement makes sense, as most auxiliary faculty, like Dr. 
Macdonald, work on annually renewable employment contracts. Thus, the Retention Policy' s 
annual review requirement would coincide with the decisions affecting the employees' 
retention, in other words, the renewal of their annual contract. If the annual review 
requirement was a generic employee review unrelated to retention decisions (that is, contract 
renewal), the requirement would surely not have been placed in the "Retention" Policy. 
The School of Medicine's requirement to review faculty members annually for 
retention is consistent with the University's Faculty Regulations, under which the School of 
Medicine promulgated its Retention Policy. The University's Faculty Regulations make clear 
that "all categories of auxiliary faculty" should be afforded "appropriate" reviews on an 
"annual" basis. The policy thus states "Review of all categories of auxiliary faculty 
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(including annual review . . .) should be appropriate in light of the category, rank, and role 
of the faculty members.") See id. at Ch. 2, § 4.B ("Terms") (emphasis added). (R. at 
138-39.) 
The annual retention review requirement is also consistent with the Letter Agreement, 
which forms part of Dr. Macdonald's employment contract. In the Letter Agreement, the 
University promised to work with Dr. Macdonald "toward meeting the criteria for 
reappointment and retention reviews" See Letter Agreement of September 19, 2001 
(emphasis added). (R. at 132.) The significance of this statement cannot be overstated. 
First, the University clearly inferred that Dr. Macdonald would be afforded an employment 
review in connection with her "reappointment and retention," which decisions were to be 
made annually.3 Second, the Letter Agreement confirms that there is no legal or linguistic 
distinction between being retained and being reappointed, as it refers to "reappointment and 
retention reviews" as opposed to retention reviews only. This is further borne out by the fact 
that there are no "reappointment" criteria set forth in any University policy other than the 
"retention" criteria set forth in the Retention Policy. The two are synonymous. Nevertheless, 
the Letter Agreement refers to "reappointment and retention reviews" thereby emphasizing 
that Dr. Macdonald's right to have her employment reviewed would not be limited just to the 
specific-year reviews mentioned earlier in the Letter Agreement but that her employment 
3
 It would make no sense to promise an employee working under an annual contract 
that it would work with the employee toward meeting the criteria for a reappointment and 
retention review if such a review was not to occur within the one-year contract period. 
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would be reviewed annually, at the time the University decided whether or not to "reappoint" 
her by renewing her annual contract. The Letter Agreement is thus in accord with the 
Retention Policy's requirement that clinical-track faculty employment be "reviewed 
annually" for retention purposes. 
Finally, the Letter Agreement establishes that Dr. Macdonald's retention reviews 
would be based on specific "criteria for reappointment and retention." Because the only 
place where such criteria are set forth is in the Retention Policy, the only reasonable 
conclusion to draw is that the referenced reviews would be conducted pursuant to the 
Retention Policy's procedures.4 The Letter Agreement between Dr. Macdonald and the 
University thus constitutes an independent contractual obligation on the University's part to 
afford Dr. Macdonald a "reappointment and retention" review using the procedures set forth 
in the Retention Policy before making any decision affecting her employment. 
In sum, because the University adopted a Retention Policy, and because this policy 
admittedly formed part of Dr. Macdonald's contract, the University undertook "a contractual 
obligation to observe [its] particular termination formalities" before deciding not to retain 
Dr. Macdonald. Piacitelli, 636 P.2d at 1066 (citations omitted). The existence of this 
contractual obligation is corroborated by the language set forth in the Letter Agreement 
signed by both parties, which establishes an independent contractual right to these same 
termination formalities, namely the protection of a retention review. 
4
 This does not appear to be disputed by the University. 
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D. It Is Undisputed That the University Failed to Follow its 
Retention Procedures Prior to Deciding Not to Retain Dr. 
Macdonald as a Faculty Member. 
Despite conceding that it adopted a Retention Policy and that this policy formed a part 
of Dr. Macdonald's binding employment contract, the University failed to provide the actual 
protections set forth in the retention policy before deciding not to retain Dr. Macdonald. In 
fact, the University candidly acknowledges that it did not provide at least eight important set 
Retention Policy safeguards prior to terminating Dr. Macdonald. (R. at 281, ^ f 10.) The 
University failed to solicit letters of recommendation about Dr. Macdonald from authorities 
in her field, failed to request a self-evaluation letter from Dr. Macdonald, failed to review the 
criteria for retention set forth in the Retention Policy with Dr. Macdonald, and failed to 
prepare a "Master Summary Document" regarding Dr. Macdonald's background, teaching, 
administrative work, clinical work and scholarly activity, among other significant failures. 
(R, at 158-59, 187-92 and 281410.) By denying Dr. Macdonald these and other important 
safeguards, the University breached its employment agreement with Dr. Macdonald, of which 
the Retention Policy was an integral part. The trial court's ruling to the contrary is, therefore, 
erroneous and must be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING REGARDING AMBIGUITY IS 
ERRONEOUS BECAUSE IT DID NOT CONSIDER ALL 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE RETENTION POLICY. 
The trial court erroneously departed from Utah Supreme Court precedent in ruling that 
the Retention Policy unambiguously deprived Dr. Macdonald of its procedural safeguards. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "ambiguity in a contract may arise . . . 
because two or more contract provisions, when read together, give rise to different or 
inconsistent meanings, even though each provision is clear when read alone." Farmers Ins. 
Exch. v. Versaw, 2004 UT 73, ^9, 99 P.3d 796. Thus, trial courts may not "cherry pick" 
provisions, which, when read in isolation, lend ostensible support to a particular parly's 
preferred interpretation. See also Cherry, 966 P.2d at 870 (noting a party's "procedural 
entitlement" under a contract is "controlled by [a]n examination of all the terms and 
conditions of [the party's] employment.") (emphasis added). 
Contrary to its clear obligation to consider all the terms of the employment contract, 
the trial court erred by focusing exclusively on language in the Retention Policy stating that: 
"In addition to third-year retention, departments may elect to review faculty members in the 
full-time clinical track at year five or year six." (R. at 228 and 288.) Relying on this same 
language, the University argued by inference that these specific-year reviews are the only 
reviews to which clinical-track faculty are entitled. 
The trial court erred in relying exclusively on this language because doing so ignores 
the Retention Policy's express requirement for annual retention review, which runs directly 
contrary to and rejects any inferred provision that clinical-track faculty are entitled to reviews 
only in specifically enumerated years. As discussed in more detail above, the Retention 
Policy unequivocally states that clinical-track faculty members must be "reviewed by the 
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department on an annual basis."5 (R. at 40-41.) The trial court further erred by not 
considering the parties' Letter Agreement, which promised that the University would work 
with Dr. Macdonald "toward meeting the criteria for reappointment and retention reviews," 
which necessarily would have had to occur prior to the time she came up for 
reappointment—within one year. Indeed, it had always been Dr. Macdonald's informed 
understanding based on these agreements that she would be afforded a retention review 
before any decision was ever made not to retain her. (R. at 158, ^ j 4-5, 165.) 
Thus, to the extent that the Retention Policy's original language regarding specific-
year reviews cannot be harmonized with its unequivocal language mandating annual reviews, 
an unavoidable ambiguity in the policy arises that must be construed against the University. 
See Versaw, 2004 UT 73, 99 P.3d 796 (reaffirming ambiguities, whether arising from 
ambiguous language in a particular contract provision or from two seemingly clear 
provisions, which, when read together, give rise to different or inconsistent meanings, must 
be construed against drafter); see also U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 1999 UT App 
303, Tf 39, 990 P.2d 945. Because the trial court failed to consider all the contract's 
provisions and the ambiguity arising therefrom, its ruling must be reversed. 
Given the ambiguity existing in the Retention Policy, it is not surprising that, in the 
wake of this lawsuit, the University has rewritten at least the retention procedures section of 
its Retention Policy to now distinguish "informal" reviews, which are to occur annually, from 
more "formal" reviews, which are to occur only during specified years. (R. at 193-204.) 
The University's actions in this regard confirms the ambiguous nature of the original policy. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE 
WERE NO GENUINE ISSUES AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT 
REGARDING DR. MACDONALD'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF 
THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING. 
Genuine issues of material fact precluded the trial court's summary judgment ruling 
dismissing Dr. Macdonald's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Summary judgment may only be granted "if the pleadings, . . . answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law." UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
At the core of Dr. Macdonald's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing is a disputed issue of material fact. Dr. Macdonald alleged that, in addition 
to inappropriately setting aside her position for a previously identified replacement who filled 
her position before it was advertised, her department chairman made false and disparaging 
representations about her, tainting the committee that should have conducted a retention 
review. (R. at 9-10.)6 These actions by Dr. Macdonald's department head undermined the 
Retention Policy's purpose to "assure that the School of Medicine appropriately recognizes 
the contributions made by individual members of the faculty." (R. at 193.) By destroying 
her opportunity for a fair and proper retention review consistent with the Retention Policy's 
6
 These allegations were confirmed by the testimony of Dr. Macdonald and Dr. 
Macdonald's coworker, Dr. Boyd Vomicil. (R. at 160 and 301.) 
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purpose, the University deprived Dr. Macdonald of one of the most important and reasonably 
expected benefits of her employment contract 
The University denies this critical fact. (R. at 166-67.) Because the University's 
denial raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding Dr. Macdonald's claim for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which stands independent from its claim 
for breach of contract, the trial court erred in disposing of this claim through summary 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court with regard to the breach of 
contract claim should be reversed and judgment should be entered in favor of Dr. Macdonald. 
The trial court's judgment with respect to the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing claim should also be reversed, remanding the same to the trial court for further 
action. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J 2 / day August, 2006. 
HOOLE & KING, L.C. 
Roger H. 
Gregory N. Hoole 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Nancy Macdonald, M.D. 
H n n l p 
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AKJKO KAWAMURA (8568) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
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Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, A DIVISION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, DBA 




Case No. 050902633 
Judge L.A. Dever 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54, this Court hereby enters judgment in Defendant's favor in 
the above-captioned matter. This judgment is entered upon Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. On January 19,2005, this matter came before the Court for hearing on the Parties' Cross-
Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff, Nancy Macdonald, was represented by Gregory N. 
Hoole. Defendant, University of Utah dba University of Utah Health Sciences Center was 
represented by Akiko Kawamura. The Court has fully considered the assertions and arguments in 
the pleadings, has heard oral argument, and is otherwise fully informed in the premises. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
' = - ' <-»c'i£ 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about October 22, 2001, Plaintiff commenced employment at the University 
of Utah Health Sciences Center (Radiology Department) as an auxiliary faculty member with a 
clinical track appointment. 
2. The Board of Trustees of the University of Utah has adopted the University of Utah 
Policy and Procedures Manual ("University Policy"), which is applicable to all faculty members. 
The Parties' contractual relationship is governed in part by the University Policy. 
3. The University Policy 9-2, Section 4.B. provides, "Appointments to the auxiliary 
faculty are for limited terms only. All annual auxiliary faculty appointments end automatically each 
June 30. After three years of continuous full-time service, an auxiliary instructional faculty member 
should be given at least 3 months notice of non-renewal of appointment, unless particular contractual 
provisions otherwise govern." 
4. Plaintiffs first year contract expired automatically on June 30,2003 and was renewed 
for a second year. 
5. Plaintiffs second year contract expired on June 30, 2004 and was not renewed. 
6. Plaintiff received notice that her contract would not be renewed on or about 
March 22, 2004, more than three months prior to the contract's expiration. 
7. Plaintiff believed that she was entitled to a review before her employment contract 
could be terminated. 
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8. Plaintiff asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, and violation of due process. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law." 
2. This Court finds there are no material facts in dispute. 
3. As a matter of law, the Court enters judgment in Defendant's favor on the breach of 
contract claim for the following reasons: 
A. The Court does not find any ambiguity in the contract. Pursuant to University 
Policy, it is clear and unambiguous that appointments to auxiliary faculty are for a limited 
term only. Up until the third year, annual auxiliary faculty appointments expire 
automatically on June 30th of each year. After the third year, auxiliary faculty are entitled 
to three months notice of non-renewal of the contract. 
B. The Court finds that pursuant to University Policy, Plaintiff s contract expired 
automatically on June 30, 2004. Even though Plaintiff had not reached her third contract 
year and was not entitled to three months notice of non-renewal, she was given three months 
notice. 
C. The Court further finds that the clear language of the University Policy did 
not entitle Plaintiff to a review. Plaintiff thereby had no right to review prior to non-renewal. 
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4. This Court enters judgment in Defendant's favor on the breach of covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing claim for the following reasons: 
A. Although contracts are subject to implied covenants of good faith, those 
covenants cannot be construed to create new rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties. 
B. Pursuant to the clear language of University Policy, this Court finds that the 
University Policy provided Defendant with complete discretion to renew or not renew 
Plaintiffs contract. This Court also finds that Defendant had no duty to provide Plaintiff 
with a review prior to non-renewal; the unambiguous language of the University Policy 
establishes the parties never agreed Plaintiff had a right to review. Moreover, the covenant 
of good faith cannot and did not create additional duties. Thus, the fact Plaintiff received 
no review was not a breach of the covenant of good faith. 
5. This Court enters judgment in Defendant's favor on the due process claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 because the University is not a "person" within the meaning of Section 1983. 
6. Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d), Defendant is entitled to its costs incurred in this 
case. 
1* DATED this v ^ day of 
HO: 
Third Dr 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PROPOSED JUDGMENTwas 
Jltfc 
sent by United States mail, postage prepaid, thiso( ' day of March, 2006, to the following: 
Roger H. Hoole 
Gregory N. Hoole 
Hoole & King, L.C. 
4276 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
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